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COLLABORATIVE SOLUTIONS TO
COLORADO RIVER WATER
SHORTAGES: THE BASIN STATES’
PROPOSAL AND BEYOND
Douglas L. Grant*
The Colorado River supplies drinking water for over twenty-seven million
people and irrigation water for over 3.5 million acres in seven western states.1
This vital resource has been gripped since 2000 by the worst drought in over a
century of recordkeeping.2 The two main reservoirs on the river, Lake Powell
and Lake Mead, began the drought ninety-five percent full.3 Five years later,
they were only forty-six percent full.4 In 2005, the Secretary of the Interior
(“Secretary”) responded to the alarming decline in storage by directing the
Bureau of Reclamation (“Reclamation”) to develop guidelines for coordinating
its operations of Lake Powell and Lake Mead under low reservoir conditions.5
Reclamation began its task by inviting input from the public, specifically
including the seven river basin states.6 The seven states soon submitted a pre* E.L. Cord Foundation Professor of Law, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of
Nevada-Las Vegas. This article is an expanded and updated version of a paper presented at
a conference on Collaboration and the Colorado River sponsored by the Saltman Center for
Conflict Resolution at the William S. Boyd School of Law in Las Vegas on October 12,
2007.
1 U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, RECORD OF DECISION —COLORADO RIVER INTERIM GUIDELINES FOR LOWER BASIN SHORTAGES AND THE COORDINATED OPERATIONS FOR LAKE POWELL AND LAKE MEAD 1 (Dec. 13, 2007), available at http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/
programs/strategies/RecordofDecision.pdf [hereinafter ROD—COLORADO RIVER INTERIM
GUIDELINES].
2 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADEMIES, COLORADO RIVER BASIN WATER
MANAGEMENT: EVALUATING AND ADJUSTING TO HYDROCLIMATIC VARIABILITY 1 (2007)
[hereinafter COLORADO RIVER BASIN WATER MANAGEMENT]; Colorado River Reservoir
Operations: Development of Lower Basin Shortage Guidelines and Coordinated Management Strategies for Lake Powell and Lake Mead, Particularly Under Low Reservoir Conditions, 71 Fed. Reg. 16,341, 16,343 (Mar. 31, 2006).
3 Colorado River Reservoir Operations: Development of Lower Basin Shortage Guidelines
and Coordinated Management Strategies for Lake Powell and Lake Mead, Particularly
Under Low Reservoir Conditions, 71 Fed. Reg. at 16,343.
4 Id.
5 Colorado River Reservoir Operations: Development of Management Strategies for Lake
Powell and Lake Mead Under Low Reservoir Conditions, 70 Fed. Reg. 34,794, 34,794 (June
15, 2005). The “Lower Basin” is a Colorado River Compact concept explained infra text
accompanying notes 19-27.
6 Colorado River Reservoir Operations: Development of Management Strategies for Lake
Powell and Lake Mead Under Low Reservoir Conditions, 70 Fed. Reg. at 34,795.
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liminary proposal7 followed on April 30, 2007, by a revised proposal.8 The
revised proposal consisted of an Agreement Concerning Colorado River Management and Operations signed by all seven states, Proposed Interim Guidelines for Colorado River Operations, and draft side agreements between certain
basin states needed to implement the proposed interim guidelines.9
On December 13, 2007, after completing the environmental impact statement process,10 the Secretary issued interim guidelines, operative through
2026,11 for Lower Basin12 shortages and coordinated operation of Lake Powell
and Lake Mead.13 The key operational elements of the Secretary’s interim
guidelines come from the basin states’ April 30, 2007, proposed interim guidelines.14 The basin states’ proposal clearly was the foundation of the Secretary’s
interim guidelines.
The basin states’ collaboration in developing their proposal represents a
remarkable achievement by parties that have not always gotten along regarding
management of the Colorado River. In Part I, this Article examines why the
collaboration succeeded. It describes the key elements of the Secretary’s
interim guidelines (which is to say, the key elements of the states’ proposed
interim guidelines), how the interim guidelines will change the operation of the
river, and why the changes will make all seven states better off. The latter goes
a long way, of course, toward explaining why the states were able to collaborate successfully. In Part II, the Article goes beyond the interim guidelines to
consider water supply and demand conditions after the guidelines expire in
2026, and it advances strategies for promoting future state collaboration to
7

Letter to Sec’y of the Interior (Feb. 3, 2006), and accompanying documents, in 2 U.S.
DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT: COLORADO RIVER INTERIM GUIDELINES FOR LOWER BASIN SHORTAGES AND COORDINATED OPERATIONS FOR LAKE POWELL AND LAKE MEAD app. J, § J.2 (2007), available at
http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/programs/strategies/FEIS/index.html [hereinafter FEIS—
COLORADO RIVER INTERIM GUIDELINES].
8 The revised proposal includes the following: Letter to Sec’y of the Interior (Apr. 30,
2007) [hereinafter Letter to Sec’y]; Agreement Concerning Colorado River Management and
Operations [hereinafter Agreement Concerning Colorado River]; Proposed Interim Guidelines for Colorado River Operations [hereinafter States’ Proposed Interim Guidelines];
Lower Colorado River Basin Intentionally Created Surplus Forbearance Agreement [hereinafter Forbearance Agreement]; and Arizona-Nevada Shortage-Sharing Agreement [hereinafter Shortage-Sharing Agreement]. These documents are reproduced in 2 FEIS—COLORADO
RIVER INTERIM GUIDELINES, supra note 7, app. J, § J.1.
9 See 2 FEIS—COLORADO RIVER INTERIM GUIDELINES, supra note 7, app. J, § J.1.
10 The final environment impact statement is dated October 2007. See 1 FEIS—COLORADO
RIVER INTERIM GUIDELINES, supra note 7, at cover page.
11 Id. at 1-1, 4-3. The reason for the interim status of the guidelines is “to gain valuable
operating experience” that will “improve the basis for making additional future operation
decisions.” Id. at 1-1.
12 “Lower Basin” is a Colorado River Compact concept explained infra text accompanying
notes 20-23.
13 ROD—COLORADO RIVER INTERIM GUIDELINES, supra note 1. Accompanying the interim
guidelines are a Seven Basin States’ Affirmation Statement, available at http://www.usbr.
gov/lc/region/programs/strategies/Affirmation.pdf, and seven implementing agreements
among Lower Basin states and major water contractors in them, available at http://www.
usbr.gov/lc/region/programs/strategies/documents.html.
14 ROD—COLORADO RIVER INTERIM GUIDELINES, supra note 1, at 7; 1 FEIS—COLORADO
RIVER INTERIM GUIDELINES, supra note 7, at 2-17.
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address looming water shortages for growing Lower Basin cities by reallocating water from agricultural to urban use.
I. THE NEW INTERIM GUIDELINES
The Secretary’s new interim guidelines have four main components: (1)
coordinated operation of Lake Powell and Lake Mead, (2) Lower Basin
shortage guidelines, (3) modification and extension interim surplus guidelines
adopted in 2001, and (4) creation and delivery of intentionally created surplus.15 The discussion below considers each of these components separately.
To facilitate the discussion, several preliminary points must be noted.
First, the Colorado River basin has an international dimension. Although the
basin lies mostly in the United States, about two percent of it extends into
Mexico.16 A treaty between the United States and Mexico allots Mexico 1.5
million acre-feet (“maf”)17 annually from the Colorado River.18
Second, the Colorado River Compact19 divides the basin in the United
States into two parts called the Upper Basin and the Lower Basin20 and apportions water between the two basins rather than among the individual states.
The dividing line between the basins runs generally west-northwesterly and
crosses the Colorado River at Lee Ferry in northern Arizona.21 The Upper
Basin includes the parts of Wyoming, Colorado, Utah, New Mexico, and Arizona that drain into the Colorado River or its tributaries above Lee Ferry.22
The Lower Basin includes the parts of Utah, New Mexico, Arizona, Nevada,
and California that drain into the Colorado River or its tributaries below Lee
Ferry.23 Article III(a) of the compact apportions to each basin in perpetuity the
exclusive beneficial consumptive use of 7.5 maf,24 and article III(b) allows the
Lower Basin an additional 1.0 maf. So the apportionments for the two basins
total sixteen maf.25
15

ROD—COLORADO RIVER INTERIM GUIDELINES, supra note 1, at 4; 1 FEIS—COLORADO
RIVER INTERIM GUIDELINES, supra note 7, at 2-17 to -19.
16 DALE PONTIUS, REPORT TO THE WESTERN WATER POLICY REVIEW ADVISORY COMM’N,
COLORADO RIVER BASIN STUDY 2-3 (1997).
17 One acre-foot of water will cover an acre of land to a depth of one foot. It is 325,851
gallons. 6 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 1220 (Robert E. Beck ed., repl. vol. 2005).
18 Treaty on the Utilization of Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio
Grande, U.S.-Mex., arts. 10(a), 11, Feb. 3, 1944, 59 Stat. 1219, 1237-38 [hereinafter Treaty].
The Mexican allotment increases to 1.7 maf if surplus is available above water uses in the
United States. Id. art. 10(b). The Mexican allotment is also subject to pro rata reduction
“[i]n the event of extraordinary drought or serious accident to the irrigation system in the
United States . . . making it difficult for the United States to deliver the guaranteed quantity.”
Id.
19 Colorado River Compact of 1922, 70 CONG. REC. 324 (1928).
20 Id. arts. II(f)-(g).
21 Id.; 1 FEIS—COLORADO RIVER INTERIM GUIDELINES, supra note 7, at 1-10 to -11.
22 Colorado River Compact art. II(f).
23 Id. art. II(g). The Upper and Lower Basins also include all parts of the seven states
outside the drainage area of the river system “which are now or shall hereafter be beneficially served by waters diverted from the System.” Id. arts. II(f)-(g).
24 Id. art. III(a).
25 Id. art. III(b).
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Third, the compact divides the seven states into two groups called the
Upper Division and the Lower Division states.26 The Lower Division states are
the three with direct riparian access to the Colorado River below Lee Ferry,
namely, California, Arizona, and Nevada.27 The Upper Division states are the
other four states, namely, Wyoming, Colorado, Utah, and New Mexico.28 The
compact imposes several obligations on the Upper Division states to deliver
water at Lee Ferry. Article III(c) says the water for Mexico shall come first
from surplus above the sixteen maf apportioned to the two basins, and absent
sufficient surplus, the two basins shall bear the deficiency equally, with the
Upper Division states obligated to deliver enough water at Lee Ferry to supply
half the deficiency.29 In addition to water for Mexico, article III(d) obligates
the Upper Division states to deliver at Lee Ferry an aggregate of seventy-five
maf every ten consecutive years for the Lower Division states.30 Finally, article III(e) prohibits the Upper Division states from withholding water they cannot reasonably put to domestic or agricultural use if the Lower Division states
can reasonably use it for those purposes.31
A. Coordinated Operation of Lake Powell and Lake Mead
1. Reservoir Operations Prior to the New Guidelines
The natural flow of the Colorado River, unaltered by human activities,
would fluctuate widely from year to year.32 To avoid flooding and to even out
the water supply for beneficial use, Reclamation operates a number of reservoirs on the Colorado River and its tributaries having a total storage capacity of
approximately sixty maf.33 Lake Powell, with a capacity of about twenty-four
maf,34 is located on the Colorado River approximately sixteen miles above Lee
Ferry.35 Lake Mead, with a capacity of about twenty-six maf, is located on the
Colorado River approximately 275 miles below Lee Ferry.36 Lake Powell is
the lowest (southernmost) reservoir in the Upper Basin. Lake Mead is the highest (northernmost) reservoir in the Lower Basin.
The Colorado River Basin Project Act of 1968 (“CRBPA”)37 requires the
Secretary, in consultation with the basin states, to adopt long-range operating
criteria for basin reservoirs. With more than ninety percent of the natural flow
26

Id. arts. II(c)-(d).
Id. art. II(d).
28 Id. art. II(c).
29 Id. art. III(c).
30 Id. art. III(d).
31 Id. art. III(e). This provision is affected by section 602(a) of the Colorado River Basin
Project Act of 1968, discussed infra text accompanying notes 37-39.
32 See 1 FEIS—COLORADO RIVER INTERIM GUIDELINES, supra note 7, at 3-15 to -16 (the
estimated annual natural flow at Lee Ferry has ranged from 5.4 to 25.4 maf over the last
century).
33 Id. at 1-19, 3-15 to -16.
34 Id. at 1-19.
35 Id. at 1-11.
36 Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 590 (1963).
37 Colorado River Basin Project Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-537, § 602, 82 Stat. 885, 900
(codified at 43 U.S.C. § 1552 (2000)).
27
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in the lower Colorado River originating in the Upper Division states,38 the
amount of water that Reclamation releases from Lake Powell largely determines the supply available from the river for the Lower Division states. Section 602(a) of the CRBPA requires the long-range operating criteria to observe
the following order of priority for storing water in Upper Basin reservoirs and
releasing water from Lake Powell:
(1) releases of water to meet the Upper Division’s duty under article III(c)
of the Colorado River Compact to supply half the deficiency, if a deficiency exists, to meet the Mexican water delivery obligation,
(2) releases of water to comply with the Upper Division’s duty under article III(d) of the compact to deliver seventy-five maf at Lee Ferry
every ten consecutive years, and
(3) storage of water reasonably necessary to assure that the Upper Division’s required deliveries to Mexico and Lee Ferry can be made without impairing Upper Basin consumptive use of up to 7.5 maf under
article III(a) of the compact; and releases of water not needed in storage for that purpose to (i) supply additional Lower Division reasonable domestic and agricultural uses above 7.5 maf, as authorized by
article III(e) of the compact, if the active storage in Lake Powell is not
less than that in Lake Mead, (ii) equalize the active storage in Lake
Powell and Lake Mead, and (iii) avoid anticipated flood spills from
Lake Powell.39
The amount of water needed in storage in Upper Basin reservoirs to assure that
the required deliveries to Mexico and Lee Ferry will not impair Upper Basin
consumptive use is called 602(a) storage.40
Under priority (3) above, Reclamation can release water from Lake Powell
to equalize storage with Lake Mead only if Upper Basin storage exceeds the
602(a) amount.41 To implement this statutory limitation, Reclamation issued
an interim guideline that permits equalization releases only if the water level in
Lake Powell equals or exceeds 3630 feet above sea level—which is equivalent
to about 14.85 maf of storage.42
In a year when no equalization releases can be made because Lake Powell
is below 3630 feet, the long-range operating criteria state that the “objective
shall be to maintain a minimum release of water from Lake Powell of 8.23
million acre-feet for that year.”43 The release of 8.23 maf when combined with
38

See 1 FEIS—COLORADO RIVER INTERIM GUIDELINES, supra note 7, at 3-15.
Colorado River Basin Project Act § 602(a), 43 U.S.C. § 1552(a).
40 Notice of Adoption of an Interim 602(a) Storage Guideline for Management of the Colorado River, 69 Fed. Reg. 28,945, 28,946 (May 19, 2004) [hereinafter Storage Guideline].
41 Another limitation, implicit in the concept of storage equalization, is that the active storage in Lake Powell must exceed the active storage in Lake Mead for Reclamation to make an
equalization release.
42 Storage Guideline, supra note 40, at 28,946; 1 FEIS—COLORADO RIVER INTERIM GUIDELINES, supra note 7, at 1-22, 2-6.
43 See Review of Existing Coordinated Long-Range Operating Criteria for Colorado River
Reservoirs, 70 Fed. Reg. 15,873, 15,875, art. II(2) (Mar. 29, 2005) [hereinafter Long-Range
Operating Criteria].
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average annual tributary inflow between Lake Powell and Lee Ferry of 0.02
maf44 will produce on average 8.25 maf at Lee Ferry.45
The period from 1995 through 1999 was unusually wet, and the Colorado
River flow entering the Lower Basin at Lee Ferry averaged about twelve maf
per year.46 Then came the multiyear drought that continues to date except for a
respite in 2005. The drought lowered the water level in Lake Powell below
3630 feet,47 triggering the provision in the long-range operating criteria regarding a minimum release of 8.23 maf. In mid-2005, the Secretary interpreted the
provision not to mandate the release of 8.23 maf but only to establish a goal she
could adjust downward to protect Upper Basin consumptive use and power
generation at Lake Powell.48 The Secretary went on to conclude, however, that
no downward adjustment was then warranted because inflows to Lake Powell
were forecasted to be above average for 2005.49
2. The New Interim Reservoir Coordination Guidelines
The new interim reservoir coordination guidelines require a higher Lake
Powell water level for equalization releases. The new level is 3636 feet in
2008 and increases annually thereafter to 3666 feet by 2026.50 In years when
Lake Powell is too low for equalization releases, the proposed guidelines link
the amount to be released to the relative water levels in Lake Powell and Lake
Mead. Depending on those levels, the releases authorized range from 7.0 to 9.5
maf.51 Based on natural flows in the river system from 1906 through 2005,52
44 1 FEIS—COLORADO RIVER INTERIM GUIDELINES, supra note 7, at 1-11, 3-19 (inflow
from the Paria River).
45 An Upper Basin delivery at Lee Ferry of 8.25 maf equates with 0.75 maf for Mexico and
7.5 maf for Lower Basin consumptive use from the mainstream—if one disregards evaporation losses. But because the two basins disagree about the circumstances under which the
Upper Basin must share half of the Mexican delivery obligation, see infra text accompanying notes 155-62, the long-range operating criteria expressly disclaim any intent to interpret
or implement the Colorado River Compact when they call for a release of 8.23 maf from
Lake Powell. See Long-Range Operating Criteria, supra note 43, at 15,875, art. II(5).
46
See Long-Range Operating Critera, supra note 43, at 15,881, Response to Comment No.
40.
47 See id. 15,880-81, Comment No. 39 and Response (8.8 maf of storage in Lake Powell).
48 Id., Responses to Comment Nos. 34, 40, 41; Letter from Gale A. Norton, Sec’y of the
Interior, to Jon Huntsman, Jr., Governor of Utah, et al. (May 2, 2005), available at http://
www.usbr.gov/lc/region/programs/strategies/scopingreport/Appendices/AppA.pdf. Arizona
soon objected that the Secretary’s 602(a) storage algorithm protected Lake Powell recreation
and power generation at the potential expense of Lower Division domestic and agricultural
uses contrary to article IV(b) of the Colorado River Compact, which gives a priority to
domestic and agricultural uses. See W. Patrick Schiffer et al., From a Colorado River Compact Challenge to the Next Era of Cooperation Among the Seven Basin States, 49 ARIZ. L.
REV. 217, 226-27 & n.53 (2007).
49 Letter from Gale A. Norton, supra note 48; see also Schiffer et al., supra note 48, at 22930.
50 ROD—COLORADO RIVER INTERIM GUIDELINES, supra note 1, § 6.A, at 51 (mirroring
States’ Proposed Interim Guidelines, supra note 8, § 3.C, at J-29); see 1 FEIS—COLORADO
RIVER INTERIM GUIDELINES, supra note 7, at 2-9 to -10.
51 ROD—COLORADO RIVER INTERIM GUIDELINES, supra note 1, §§ 6.B-D, at 52-53 (mirroring States’ Proposed Interim Guidelines, supra note 8, § 3.C, at J-30); 1 FEIS—COLORADO
RIVER INTERIM GUIDELINES, supra note 7, at 2-10 to -11.
52 1 FEIS—COLORADO RIVER INTERIM GUIDELINES, supra note 7, at 4-4.
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Reclamation estimates the probability under the new guidelines of an annual
release from Lake Powell of less than 8.23 maf between 2008 and 2026 to be
about ten percent.53 By comparison, the probability of that happening under
the nebulous previous policy was perhaps less than one-third of one percent54
Although the detailed water level requirements for releases from Lake
Powell in the new guidelines may benefit all the basin states by providing
greater predictability of releases, the Upper Division states should be the main
beneficiaries of the higher required water levels. Reduced equalization releases
and minimum releases from Lake Powell will leave more water in storage
there, and this in turn will decrease the risk that a future multiyear drought will
require the Upper Division states to curtail their consumptive water uses to
comply with their article III(d) compact duty to deliver seventy-five maf at Lee
Ferry every ten consecutive years.55
B. Lower Basin Shortage Guidelines
1. Shortage Rules Prior to the New Interim Guidelines
The Boulder Canyon Project Act of 1928 (“BCPA”)56 authorized the Secretary to contract for the storage and delivery of Colorado River water for
power generation and consumptive use in the Lower Basin.57 The Secretary
has contracted to deliver water for 8.462 maf of consumptive use annually.
The breakdown by state is California 5.362 maf, Arizona 2.8 maf, and Nevada
0.3 maf.58 The California contracts are subject, however, to the limitation that
California can consume no more than 4.4 maf of the first 7.5 maf available plus
not more than half of any surplus above 7.5 maf.59
In 1963, the United States Supreme Court held in Arizona v. California 60
that the BCPA and the Secretary’s contracts apportioned the mainstream Colorado River (but not tributary waters) in the Lower Basin among the three Lower
Division states.61 The Court’s decree provides that if the supply available for
consumptive use in a given year is
• 7.5 maf,
California gets 4.4 maf
Arizona gets 2.8 maf
Nevada gets 0.3 maf
• more than 7.5 maf,
California gets 50% of the surplus
53

See id. at 4-40 tbl.4.3-11.
See id.
55 William Hasencamp, Colorado River Agreement & Southern California Water, WATER
REP., May 15, 2007, at 1, 6.
56 Boulder Canyon Project Act of 1928, Pub. L. No. 642, 45 Stat. 1057 (codified at 43
U.S.C. §§ 617-617t (2000)).
57 See Boulder Canyon Project Act § 5, 43 U.S.C. § 617d.
58 Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 562 (1963).
59 See Boulder Canyon Project Act § 4, 43 U.S.C. § 617c; California Limitation Act, 1929
Cal. Stat. 38-39.
60 Arizona, 373 U.S. 546.
61 Id. at 564-65.
54
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Arizona gets 46% of the surplus
Nevada gets 4% of the surplus
• less than 7.5 maf,
Water rights predating the BCPA must be supplied first regardless of
state lines, and the Secretary can exercise reasonable discretion in distributing any remaining water, except that California cannot get more
than 4.4 maf.62
In 1968, the CRBPA limited the Secretary’s discretion in distributing
water when less than 7.5 maf is available for consumptive use. The CRBPA
authorized construction of the Central Arizona Project (“CAP”) to transport up
to 1.7 maf of Arizona’s 2.8 maf annual apportionment from the Colorado River
to central Arizona for consumptive use.63 But the CRBPA provides that when
less than 7.5 maf is available, Arizona’s right to CAP water shall be
subordinate to California’s right to consume 4.4 maf.64 This means all CAP
users must be shut off before California users suffer any supply reduction. The
Act also states Nevada shall not have to bear a greater share of any shortage
than it would without the special protection for California.65
Reclamation calls the three annual water supply situations in the Arizona
v. California decree (7.5 maf, more than that, and less than that) normal, surplus, and shortage conditions.66 The long-range operating criteria require the
Secretary to issue an annual operating plan that, among other things, declares
which water supply condition will be operative for the year.67 The criteria
provide only vague guidance, however, about how the Secretary should make
that determination.68 To date the Secretary has never declared a shortage condition, so there is no operating experience regarding shortages.69
2. The New Interim Shortage Guidelines
The new guidelines call for stepped Secretarial shortage determinations of
333,000, 417,000, and 500,000 acre-feet, triggered at three specified decreasing
water levels in Lake Mead: 1075, 1050, and 1025 feet above sea level, respec62

Arizona v. California, 126 S. Ct. 1543, 1546 (2006) (Consolidated Decree art. II(B)).
The Consolidated Decree merges the original decree, 376 U.S. 340 (1964), with various
amended and supplemental decrees, 383 U.S. 268 (1966); 439 U.S. 419 (1979); 466 U.S.
144 (1984); 531 U.S. 1 (2000). The decree provision regarding Secretarial discretion if the
supply is less than 7.5 maf refers to the Court’s opinion, which states in pertinent part:
“While the Secretary must follow the standards set out in the [BCPA], he nevertheless is free
to choose among the recognized methods of apportionment or to devise reasonable methods
of his own.” 373 U.S. at 593.
63 Colorado River Basin Project Act § 301(b), 43 U.S.C. § 1521(b) (2000); 1 FEIS—COLORADO RIVER INTERIM GUIDELINES, supra note 7, at 3-39.
64 Colorado River Basin Project Act § 301(b), 43 U.S.C. § 1521(b).
65 Id.
66 Long-Range Operating Criteria, supra note 43, at 15,875, art. III(3); 1 FEIS—COLORADO
RIVER INTERIM GUIDELINES, supra note 7, at 1-22 to -23.
67 Long-Range Operating Criteria, supra note 43, at 15,874, art. I.
68 See id. at 15,875, art. III(3) (listing factors to be weighed); 1 FEIS—COLORADO RIVER
INTERIM GUIDELINES, supra note 7, at 2-3 (“no specific guidance”).
69 1 FEIS—COLORADO RIVER INTERIM GUIDELINES, supra note 7, at 2-3.
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tively.70 If Lake Mead is projected to drop below 1000 feet, the guidelines call
for the Secretary to consult with the seven basin states about possible further
shortage measures consistent with the law of the river.71
The treaty allotting Mexico 1.5 maf annually from the Colorado River
provides for pro rata reduction if “extraordinary drought or serious accident to
the irrigation system in the United States . . . mak[es] it difficult . . . to deliver”
that much water to Mexico.72 The basin states’ agreement urges the United
States to invoke this proviso to reduce deliveries to Mexico during Secretarial
shortage determinations, so that the corresponding Mexican reductions associated with the three stepped shortages in the Lower Basin would be 67,000,
83,000, and 100,000 acre-feet.73 The United States contemplates conducting
appropriate discussions with Mexico about this.74
Consistent with the CRBPA, the new interim shortage guidelines also call
for Arizona and Nevada to share the entire burden of the three stepped reductions, with none of the shortage borne by California.75 A side agreement
between Arizona and Nevada allocates nearly all of the three reductions to Arizona, e.g., if the shortage is 500,000 acre-feet, Arizona must bear 480,000 acrefeet of it.76
If the United States implements the basin states’ proposal for Mexico to
share in shortages, the main beneficiary will be Arizona because of its shortage
vulnerability regarding CAP water. Nevada would benefit but to a lesser
extent. California would benefit from Mexican shortage sharing only if a
Lower Basin shortage were to exceed approximately 1.7 maf in a year and
shortage sharing above that level were to apply to all three Lower Division
states.77
Arizona has been preparing for possible shortages since 1996 by storing
CAP water not currently needed for consumptive use in groundwater basins in
the state.78 Generally, the banked water should enable Arizona to cope with
the stepped shortages in the new interim shortage guidelines79 (although Arizona has expressed concern about the additional costs agricultural users will
incur to extract the banked water and about the risk that some productive agri70 ROD—COLORADO RIVER INTERIM GUIDELINES, supra note 1, § 2.D.1, at 36-37 (substantively mirroring States’ Proposed Interim Guidelines, supra note 8, § 4.D.1, at J-33); 1
FEIS—COLORADO RIVER INTERIM GUIDELINES, supra note 7, at 2-18.
71 ROD—COLORADO RIVER INTERIM GUIDELINES, supra note 1, § 7.B.4, at 55 (substantively mirroring States’ Proposed Interim Guidelines, supra note 8, § 4.D.3, at J-33 to -34).
72 Treaty, supra note 18, art. 10(b).
73 See Agreement Concerning Colorado River, supra note 8, J-18 to -19; Letter to Sec’y,
supra note 8, at J-3.
74 See ROD—COLORADO RIVER INTERIM GUIDELINES, supra note 1, § 7.B.3, at 54; 1
FEIS—COLORADO RIVER INTERIM GUIDELINES, supra note 7, at 2-18 n.7.
75 See ROD—COLORADO RIVER INTERIM GUIDELINES, supra note 1, § 2.D.1, at 36-37.
76 Shortage-Sharing Agreement, supra note 8, at J-76. The interim guidelines incorporate
the shortage sharing specified in the side agreement between Arizona and Nevada. See
States’ Proposed Interim Guidelines, supra note 8, § 4.D.4, at J-34.
77 See 1 FEIS—COLORADO RIVER INTERIM GUIDELINES, supra note 7, at 4-147.
78 See Margaret Bushman LaBianca, Note, The Arizona Water Bank and the Law of the
River, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 659 (1998).
79 Hasencamp, supra note 55, at 6; see also ARIZ. WATER BANKING AUTH., ANNUAL
REPORT 2005, at 11 (2006) (accumulated groundwater storage of 2.3 maf).
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cultural lands without reasonable physical access to replacement will be permanently retired if shortages continue multiple consecutive years80). Should a
drought occur that is severe enough to require a larger shortage determination
than 500,000 acre-feet in the Lower Basin, the new guidelines give Arizona the
opportunity (with other basin states) to negotiate with the Secretary about how
to address the larger shortage.
C. Modification and Extension of the 2001 Interim Surplus Guidelines
1. The 2001 Interim Surplus Guidelines
Although California began consuming more than 4.4 maf per year in the
mid-1950s, total Lower Basin consumptive use remained under 7.5 maf for
several decades because Arizona and Nevada were using a fraction of their
apportionments, and California was able to draw on their unused portions.81
Starting in 1989, however, and continuing through 2002, the Secretary frequently released more than 7.5 maf annually from Lake Mead, and California
received almost all of the surplus.82 California’s consumptive use during that
period was between 5.1 and 5.2 maf in three years and exceeded 5.2 maf in six
years.83
Secretarial surplus releases from Lake Mead not fully justified by inflow
to the reservoir obviously could cause problems. The releases would reduce
storage in Lake Mead and thereby increase the risk of future shortages in the
Lower Basin. Furthermore, the releases could trigger equalization releases
from Lake Powell and thus increase the risk that Upper Basin water users
would need to cut back later so the Upper Division states could meet their
water delivery obligations under the Colorado River Compact. Consequently,
the Secretary came under mounting pressure from the other basin states to be
80

Letter from Herbert R. Guenther, Ariz. Dep’t of Water Res., to Dirk Kempthorne, Sec’y
of the Interior (Apr. 30, 2007), available at http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/programs/strategies/DEIScomments/State/ADWR.pdf (also stating Arizona’s analysis of Reclamation’s data
indicates a twenty-nine percent probability of five or more years of consecutive shortage
during the interim period).
81 See Lower Colorado River Region – Colorado River Water Uses Since 1906, http://www.
usbr.gov/lc/region/g4000/uses.html (last visited May 28, 2008) [hereinafter Colorado River
Water Uses]. Set forth below from this document are consumptive use figures, in maf, at
ten-year intervals since 1950.

82

Year

Lower Basin Total

California

Arizona

Nevada

1950

4.64

4.04

0.59

0.01

1960

6.10

4.98

1.10

0.02

1970

6.25

5.02

1.20

0.04

1980

5.99

4.73

1.17

0.09

1990

7.66

5.22

2.26

0.18

2000

8.29

5.16

2.80

0.32

See id. Lower basin consumptive use exceeded 7.5 maf six times during the 1990s and
all of the early years of the 2000s.
83 See id.
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judicious about declaring surpluses and to wean California from depending on
the Colorado River for more than 4.4 maf of annual consumptive use.84
In 2001, the Secretary adopted Interim Surplus Guidelines, to be operative
from 2002 through 2016.85 The intent of the guidelines was to regularize surplus determinations by linking them to water levels in Lake Mead and to afford
California a soft landing by giving it fifteen years to adjust gradually to loss of
surplus. The guidelines authorize four types of surplus determinations, namely,
flood control surplus, quantified surplus, full domestic surplus, and partial
domestic surplus.86 The guidelines provide that as Lake Mead declines from
the flood control level through the other levels, the surplus releases allowed
reduce progressively until they are eliminated. The guidelines also condition
the Secretary’s determination of a surplus upon California meeting benchmarks
toward reducing its consumptive use to 4.4 maf by 2016.87
The surplus guidelines did not work as expected. The Secretary temporarily suspended them at the end of 2002 because California failed to make
appropriate progress on a plan to reduce its reliance on surplus.88 Then, with
the drought that began in 2000 continuing, Lake Mead dropped and has
remained below the water level allowing surplus determinations. The Secretary
has not declared a surplus since 2002, so California has received Colorado
River water for only about 4.4 maf of consumptive use each year since then.89
2. The New Interim Surplus Guidelines
The new interim guidelines eliminate one type of surplus (partial domestic
surplus) and will limit another one (full domestic surplus) starting in 2017.90
This modification should leave more water stored in Lake Mead and thereby
potentially reduce the frequency and severity of future Secretarial shortage
determinations in the Lower Basin.91 This is especially important to Arizona
given its shortage vulnerability. Also, more water in Lake Mead could reduce
equalization releases from Lake Powell, which would benefit the Upper Divisions states.
In addition, the new surplus guidelines extend the period allowing Secretarial surplus determinations by ten years to 2026.92 The extension potentially
benefits Lower Division states by allowing more time for the current drought
84

PONTIUS, supra note 16, at 32; James S. Lochhead, An Upper Basin Perspective on California’s Claims to Water from the Colorado River Part II: The Development, Implementation and Collapse of California’s Plan to Live Within Its Basic Apportionment, 6 U. DENV.
WATER L. REV. 318, 352-53 (2003).
85 Colorado River Interim Surplus Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 7772, 7772-82 (Jan. 25, 2001).
86 Id. at 7780-81.
87 Id. at 7782.
88 JAMES H. DAVENPORT, NEVADA WATER LAW 208-09 (2003).
89 See Colorado River Water Uses, supra note 81.
90 See ROD—COLORADO RIVER INTERIM GUIDELINES, supra note 1, § 2.B, at 34-35 (substantively mirroring States’ Proposed Interim Guidelines, supra note 8, § 4.B, at J-30 to
-32); 1 FEIS—COLORADO RIVER INTERIM GUIDELINES, supra note 7, at 2-11 to -12, 2-19.
91 1 FEIS—COLORADO RIVER INTERIM GUIDELINES, supra note 7, at 2-12.
92 See ROD—COLORADO RIVER INTERIM GUIDELINES, supra note 1, § 8.A, at 57 (substantively mirroring States’ Proposed Interim Guidelines, supra note 8, § 9.A, at J-44).
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cycle to end and a wet cycle to emerge that will produce surplus water levels in
Lake Mead.
D. Creation and Delivery of Intentionally Created Surplus
The most imaginative part of the basin states’ agreement proposes a new
type of water called Intentionally Created Surplus (“ICS”).93 This is water that
a contractor (an entity with a Secretarial water delivery contract or other entitlement to mainstream water)94 creates by conservation, supply augmentation, or
similar measures. More specifically, the proposed guidelines recognize four
categories of ICS:
(1) Extraordinary Conservation ICS. This includes mainstream water that
a contractor frees up by fallowing irrigated land, lining canals to stop
seepage loss, and desalination of ocean or brackish water that is used
in lieu of mainstream water.95 The creation of this category of ICS is
subject to annual and cumulative limits,96 and the Secretary’s delivery
of it for use by the contractor is also subject to annual limits.97
(2) Tributary Conservation ICS. This is water made available by a contractor’s purchase of long-exercised, pre-BCPA water rights on a tributary of the Colorado River within the contractor’s state.98
(3) System Efficiency ICS. This is mainstream water saved from loss by
a Secretarial project the contractor financed or helped finance. The
Secretary can make an equivalent amount of water available to the
contractor but only on a temporary basis even though the useful life of
the project will be far longer.99
(4) Imported ICS. This is water not naturally in the Colorado River system that the contractor introduces into the mainstream Colorado
River.100
A contractor that creates ICS can store it in Lake Mead for use later that
year or in a future year.101 For example, a California contractor might take
25,000 acre-feet less from Lake Mead than it otherwise would because of land
fallowing or canal lining and in return would receive an ICS storage credit in
Lake Mead that it could draw on later.
93

See id. § 3, at 38-43 (substantively mirroring States’ Proposed Interim Guidelines, supra
note 8, § 1.A.11, at J-26).
94 Id. at 30.
95 Id. § 3.A.1, at 38 (substantively mirroring States’ Proposed Interim Guidelines, supra
note 8, § 5.D.1, at J-35).
96 See id. §§ 3.B.4-5, at 41 (substantively mirroring States’ Proposed Interim Guidelines,
supra note 8, § 5.D.5.e, at J-38).
97 Id. § 3.C.4, at 42 (substantively mirroring States’ Proposed Interim Guidelines, supra
note 8, § 5.D.6.e, at J-40).
98 Id. § 3.A.2, at 38-39 (generally tracking but eliminating a geographical limitation in
States’ Proposed Interim Guidelines, supra note 8, § 5.D.2, at J-36).
99 Id. § 3.A.3, at 39 (substantively mirroring States’ Proposed Interim Guidelines, supra
note 8, § 5.D.3, at J-36).
100 Id. § 3.A.4, at 39 (substantively mirroring States’ Proposed Interim Guidelines, supra
note 8, § 5.D.4, at J-37).
101 See 1 FEIS—COLORADO RIVER INTERIM GUIDELINES, supra note 7, at 2-2, 2-11, 2-19.
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1. ICS Prior to the New Interim Guidelines
Prior to the new interim guidelines, there was no authorization for a contractor to create ICS. If a contractor were somehow to create the equivalent of
ICS in Lake Mead by, say, land fallowing or canal lining, the water would be
fully subject to the Arizona v. California decree. That decree apportions
among the three Lower Division states “the water in Lake Mead, Lake Mohave,
Lake Havasu and all other water in the mainstream below Lee Ferry and within
the United States.”102 Applied literally, “the water in Lake Mead” includes any
water that is there due to a contractor’s ICS activities. With California limited
by the decree to half of any surplus above 7.5 maf, the California contractor in
the example above would not have a right to receive all 25,000 acre-feet in
Lake Mead resulting from its land fallowing or canal lining. The contractor
could only take half of it, and contractors in Arizona and Nevada could together
claim the other half.
2. The New Interim ICS Guidelines
Generally, the interim ICS guidelines make only five percent of the ICS
that a contractor creates subject to the Arizona v. California decree, so the
contractor would be entitled to the other ninety-five percent,103 minus evaporation loss in some instances if the water is stored in Lake Mead for more than a
year.104 To enable this result, the Lower Division states and certain contractors
within them entered into a forbearance agreement whereby they agreed to
waive their rights under the Arizona v. California decree to ICS that the Secretary releases for use in another state.105
The interim ICS guidelines allow Reclamation to deliver ICS for use only
during years when the Secretary has declared a surplus condition.106 But the
guidelines also recognize another new category of water called Developed
Shortage Supply that is similar to two types of ICS, namely, Tributary Conservation ICS and Imported ICS.107 Reclamation can deliver this water for use
only during years when the Secretary has declared a shortage condition.108
102

Arizona v. California, 126 S. Ct. 1543, 1545 (2006) (Consolidated Decree art. I(E)).
See ROD—COLORADO RIVER INTERIM GUIDELINES, supra note 1, § 3.B.2, at 40 (substantively mirroring States’ Proposed Interim Guidelines, supra note 8, § 5.D.5.c, at J-37 to 38). An exception to the general rule exists for System Efficiency ICS; one hundred percent
of it goes to the contractor that created it. Id. § 3.B.2.a, at 40 (substantively mirroring
States’ Proposed Interim Guidelines, supra note 8, § 5.D.5.c.(1), at J-38).
104 See id. § 3.B.7, at 41 (substantively mirroring States’ Proposed Interim Guidelines,
supra note 8, § 5.D.5.e(5), at J-38 to -39) (applies to Extraordinary Conservation ICS, but no
evaporation losses can be assessed during shortage condition years).
105 See Lower Colorado River Basin Intentionally Created Surplus Forbearance Agreement,
art. 3, available at http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/programs/strategies/agreements/Forbear
ance.PDF [hereinafter Forbearance Agreement].
106 See States’ Proposed Interim Guidelines, supra note 8, § 4.A, at J-30, § 4.B.5.a, at J-32.
107 ROD—COLORADO RIVER INTERIM GUIDELINES, supra note 1, § 4.A, at 44 (substantively
mirroring States’ Proposed Interim Guidelines, supra note 8, § 6.A, at J-42).
108 Id. § 4.C.2, at 45 (substantively mirroring States’ Proposed Interim Guidelines, supra
note 8, § 6.E, at J-42 to -43). Also, a contractor can create Developed Shortage Surplus only
during shortage condition years. Id. § 4.B.3, at 45.
103
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One purpose of the proposed ICS guidelines is to raise the water levels of
Lake Mead and Lake Powell higher than they otherwise would be.109 Of
course, the Upper Division states stand to benefit from a higher Lake Powell
water level. But the major beneficiaries of the ICS guidelines will be the three
Lower Division states. All three will benefit by sharing the five percent of ICS
created in any Lower Division state that becomes subject to the Arizona v.
California decree. In addition, individual Lower Division states will benefit
from the ninety-five percent made available from particular projects for use
exclusively within their borders. California and Nevada are likely to see a
number of ICS projects in the near future.
In California, the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California
(“MWD”) has a junior priority relative to other contractors in the state and
consequently must bear the full burden of reducing the state’s consumptive use
of mainstream water from approximately 5.2 to 4.4 maf.110 MWD supplies
water from the Colorado River and other sources to eighteen million people
residing in six Southern California counties.111 To replace its loss of surplus
water since 2002, MWD has, among other things, purchased water from agricultural users in California made available by MWD-financed conservation and
land fallowing programs.112 The proposed ICS guidelines should facilitate
more agricultural-to-urban transfers by enabling MWD to store purchased
mainstream water in Lake Mead with only five percent of it subject to the
Arizona v. California decree and MWD having sole claim to the other ninetyfive percent.113
In Nevada, nearly all the state’s apportionment of Colorado River water
goes to the Southern Nevada Water Authority (“SNWA”) for use in metropolitan Las Vegas.114 In past years, SNWA has banked mainstream water underground for future use,115 but with the metropolitan area growing rapidly in
population and Nevada now regularly consuming all, or nearly all, of its “normal condition” apportionment of 0.3 maf, SNWA has moved on several fronts
to develop additional water supplies.
SNWA has purchased pre-BCPA agricultural water rights on tributaries of
the Colorado River in Nevada and will fallow the lands irrigated with this
water.116 Rather than build a pipeline to transport the purchased water to the
Las Vegas area, it would be more economical if SNWA could just let the purchased tributary water flow into Lake Mead and extract it from there through
its existing intakes. The problem for SNWA with sending the water through
109

Id. at 27 (substantively mirroring States’ Proposed Interim Guidelines, supra note 8,
§ 5.B.4, at J-34).
110 Hasencamp, supra note 55, at 5.
111 Id. at 1.
112 See id. at 4-5.
113 Id. at 6.
114 1 FEIS—COLORADO RIVER INTERIM GUIDELINES, supra note 7, at 3-42.
115 SNWA’s several groundwater banking projects are described in S. NEV. WATER AUTH.,
WATER RESOURCE PLAN 08, at 28 (2008), available at http://www.snwa.com/assets/pdf/
wr_plan_chapter2.pdf [ hereinafter 2008 PLAN].
116 SNWA has also purchased tributary water rights that postdate the BCPA, see id. at 2627, but the basin states’ agreement is limited to those rights that predate the BCPA. See
Agreement Concerning Colorado River, supra note 8, ¶ 8, at J-17.
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Lake Mead is that the Arizona v. California decree, applied literally, would
entitle SNWA to only a small fraction of this water. The new interim guidelines will solve this problem by enabling SNWA to treat the added water as
Tributary Conservation ICS,117 so only five percent of it will be subject to the
decree and SNWA will be entitled to the other ninety-five percent.
Another SNWA strategy is a new project to pump groundwater from
nineteen basins in east-central Nevada118 and transport it through an extensive
pipeline system estimated to cost $2 to 3.5 billion to metropolitan Las
Vegas.119 The imported groundwater will be only partly consumed by municipal use; the unconsumed part will go through the municipal wastewater system
and be discharged into Lake Mead. The new interim guidelines will enable
SNWA to get Imported ICS treatment for the once-used imported water that is
discharged into Lake Mead.120 SNWA will then have sole claim to reuse
ninety-five percent of it.
SNWA’s project to import groundwater will not be completed until 2014
or later.121 In the meantime, the Las Vegas area likely will run short of water
for its growing population, so SNWA needs a supplemental water source on a
temporary basis. For this purpose, SNWA will fund federal construction of a
project in Southern California near the Mexican border known as the Drop 2
Reservoir.122 This reservoir will capture Colorado River water that otherwise
would have flowed to Mexico due to operational inefficiencies, unrelated to
and not counting toward the United States’ treaty delivery obligation.123 The
Secretary will deliver the captured water to California water users, enabling
them to take less water from Lake Mead; and in return, SNWA will be credited
with System Efficiency ICS in Lake Mead.124
The MWD and SNWA projects just described have been approved by the
Secretary and are supported by implementing side agreements among the
affected states and water contractors.125 The interim guidelines establish a pro117 See ROD—COLORADO RIVER INTERIM GUIDELINES, supra note 1, § 3.A.2, at 38-39
(substantively mirroring States’ Proposed Interim Guidelines, supra note 8, § 5.D.3, at J-36).
118 2008 PLAN, supra note 115, at 30-34; 1 FEIS—COLORADO RIVER INTERIM GUIDELINES,
supra note 7, at 5-7.
119 Henry Brean, Battle with Utah Brewing, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., Aug. 2, 2007, at 1A; Henry
Brean, Bigger Pipeline Plan Floated, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., Nov. 6, 2007, at 1B.
120 See ROD—COLORADO RIVER INTERIM GUIDELINES, supra note 1, § 3.A.4, at 39 (substantively mirroring States’ Proposed Interim Guidelines, supra note 8, § 5.D.4, at J-37).
121 1 FEIS—COLORADO RIVER INTERIM GUIDELINES, supra note 7, at 5-7; Henry Brean,
Deal Outlines How States Will Share Drought Burden, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., Dec. 6, 2007, at
1A.
122 Agreement Concerning Colorado River, supra note 8, ¶ 8, at J-17.
123 U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, LOWER COLORADO RIVER
DROP 2 STORAGE RESERVOIR PROJECT: FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT 1-4 to -7
(2007), available at http://www.usbr.gov/lc/yuma/environmental_docs/Drop_2/finalea/fea1.
pdf. Reclamation estimates that the reservoir, which will have a storage capacity of 8000
acre-feet, will capture an average of 70,000 acre-feet per year. Id. at 2-1, 2-7.
124 SNWA withdrawals of this System Efficiency ICS storage are limited to 40,000 acrefeet annually. Agreement Concerning Colorado River, supra note 8, ¶ 8, at J-17.
125 See, e.g., Forbearance Agreement, supra note 105, exhibit A (Southern Nevada Water
Authority Virgin and Muddy Rivers Tributary Conservation, Intentionally Created Surplus
(ICS) Project), exhibit C (Drop 2 Reservoir System Efficiency Project), exhibit D (IID
Extraordinary Water Conservation Project – Fallowing).
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cess for water contractors to obtain approval of additional ICS projects from the
Secretary.126
E. An Assessment of the Interim Guidelines (and Basin States’ Proposal)
As noted earlier, the Secretary’s interim guidelines, which are based on
the basin states’ proposal, will be operative through 2026.127 The water supply
outlook for the Lower Division states during this period is hardly
unproblematic. For example, the probability of a shortage condition, i.e., water
for less than 7.5 maf of consumptive use, in 2010 is seven percent.128 The
probability Lake Mead will drop below the water level needed for the upper of
SNWA’s two water intakes by 2016 is fifteen percent.129 And the probability
of shortage of at least 400,000 acre-feet annually that lasts for five consecutive
years or more is twenty-two percent.130
Still, the outlook for the Lower Division states is far from dire during the
interim period. In every year, the probability of a shortage condition is much
less than the combined probabilities of a surplus condition or a normal condition.131 In 2017, for example, the probability of a shortage condition is twentyseven percent132 versus thirty-five percent for a surplus condition and thirtyeight percent for a normal condition.133 For the entire interim period, the
probability of a multiyear shortage exceeding 500,000 acre-feet per year is
zero.134
When the Secretary announced her intent in 2005 to develop interim
guidelines for Lower Basin water shortages and coordinated reservoir operations and sought input from the seven basin states, this created an incentive for
the states to reach agreement on a proposal. If they could agree, they had every
reason to think their proposal would profoundly influence the Secretary’s
guidelines. If they could not agree, it was hard to predict the content of the
Secretary’s guidelines. This incentive to reach agreement, however, did not
guarantee the states would succeed. The genius of their proposal is that it contains a mix of innovative elements that combine to make every state better off
than before.
Perhaps most important, the ICS element of the basin states’ proposal will
increase the Lower Division’s water supply or make it more productive, or
both. The Secretary could not have implemented an ICS program by regulation
126 See ROD—COLORADO RIVER INTERIM GUIDELINES, supra note 1, § 3.B.1, at 40 (generally tracking States’ Proposed Interim Guidelines, supra note 8, § 5.D.5.a, at J-37, but eliminating a proposed requirement that the Secretary consult with the other basin states before
approving a new ICS project).
127 See supra text accompanying note 11.
128 1 FEIS—COLORADO RIVER INTERIM GUIDELINES, supra note 7, at 4-100 tbl.4.4-1. This
figure, like the ones that follow, is based on Reclamation’s analysis of mainstream river flow
data for the 100-year period from 1906 through 2005. Id. at 4-4 to -5.
129 See id. at 4-59 to -60 tbl.4.3-23. SNWA has responded to the risk by planning to build a
third, deeper intake. Id. at 5-7 to -8.
130 Id. at 4-114 to -115 tbl.4.4-11.
131 See id. at 4-122 fig.4.4-19.
132 Id. at 4-100 tbl.4.4-2.
133 See id. at 4-122 fig.4.4-19.
134 See id. at 4-114.
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alone. No water contractor would have much incentive to develop a conservation or augmentation project that uses Lake Mead for storage without a forbearance agreement in place to avoid literal application of the Arizona v. California
decree. The Secretary could not have imposed forbearance on the Lower Division states and contractors by regulation, so their collaboration was essential to
the ICS program.
II. BEYOND

THE

INTERIM GUIDELINES

A. Long-Term Water Supply and Demand
The mainstream water supply outlook for the Lower Division states during
the interim period is not worse than just described because the Upper Basin will
be using much less than its 7.5 maf compact apportionment during that period.
The Upper Basin forecasts that its consumptive use, including reservoir evaporation, will be 5.1 maf in 2008 and will rise gradually thereafter to 5.5 maf by
2026.135
The Upper Basin expects its consumptive use to continue rising steadily
after the interim period and reach 6.0. maf by 2060.136 Reclamation has calculated the impact of this expected steady rise on the Lower Basin. For example,
Reclamation finds that the probability of a Lower Basin shortage condition in
2040 is forty-nine percent and in 2060 is sixty-seven percent.137 Also, Reclamation finds that the probability of a shortage condition exceeding 500,000
acre-feet between 2027 and 2060 is eleven and two-tenths percent.138
Reclamation’s findings may be too bleak for two reasons. First, Reclamation used the Upper Basin’s expectations in making its calculations, and one
might question whether Upper Basin consumptive use in 2008, the start of the
interim period and the basis for projections thereafter, will actually be 5.1 maf.
Upper Basin consumptive use averaged only 4.4 maf from 1996 through 2000
and 4.2 maf from 2001 through 2005.139 Second, Reclamation assumed that
once the interim guidelines expire in 2026, it will revert back to operating the
river as it did prior to adoption of the interim guidelines.140 While at least one
Upper Basin state opposes extending the guidelines on coordinated reservoir
135 See id. at 3-32; 2 FEIS—COLORADO RIVER INTERIM GUIDELINES, supra note 7, at C-1
tbl.C-1 (reservoir evaporation of 0.6 maf per year; consumptive use excluding evaporation
loss of 4.5 maf in 2008 rising to 4.9 maf by 2026).
136 See 1 FEIS—COLORADO RIVER INTERIM GUIDELINES, supra note 7, at 3-32; 2 FEIS—
COLORADO RIVER INTERIM GUIDELINES, supra note 7, at C-1 tbl.C-1 (5.4 maf not including
evaporation loss, plus annual reservoir evaporation of 0.6 maf).
137 1 FEIS—COLORADO RIVER INTERIM GUIDELINES, supra note 7, at 4-102 tbl.4.4-4.
138 See id. at 4-142 tbl.4.4-13.
139 See U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, COLORADO RIVER SYSTEM
CONSUMPTIVE USES AND LOSSES REPORT 1996-2000, at iv, 14, 23 (2004) [hereinafter CONSUMPTIVE USES AND LOSSES], available at http://www.usbr.gov/uc/library/envdocs/reports/
crs/pdfs/crs962000.pdf; U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, PROVISIONAL UPPER COLORADO RIVER BASIN CONSUMPTIVE USES AND LOSSES REPORT 20012005, at iv, 9, 11 (2007), available at http://www.usbr.gov/uc/library/envdocs/reports/crs/
pdfs/cul2001-05.pdf.
140 See 1 FEIS—COLORADO RIVER INTERIM GUIDELINES, supra note 7, at 4-3, 4-16. As a
limited exception to reversion back after 2026, Reclamation can continue to deliver previously created ICS that remains in storage. See ROD—COLORADO RIVER INTERIM GUIDE-
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operations beyond the interim period,141 significant parts of the interim guidelines likely will be continued in some form to ameliorate Lower Basin
shortages.142
As an alternative to Reclamation’s long-term estimates, it is interesting to
consider the mainstream water supply for the Lower Division states on an average basis once Upper Basin consumptive use reaches 6.0 maf, whether that
happens in 2060 or sooner or later. For the 100-year period from 1906 through
2005, the average annual natural flow in the mainstream at Lee Ferry was fifteen maf.143 If that historical pattern continues, the future average mainstream
supply for the Lower Division states would be as follows:
Flow entering the Lower Basin at Lee Ferry (15.0–6.0 maf) 9.0 maf
Plus tributary inflows below Lee Ferry
+1.0 maf144
Minus the Mexican delivery obligation
– 1.5 maf
Minus Lower Basin mainstream reservoir evaporation
– 1.3 maf145
Amount in the mainstream for Lower Division consumptive use 7.2 maf
The so-called “normal condition” under the Arizona v. California decree
of enough water for 7.5 maf of consumptive use in the Lower Division states
would not be a normal occurrence. The norm, or average, would be about
300,000 acre-feet less than that.
The average shortfall would worsen, of course, should future average
annual natural flows at Lee Ferry be less than during the period from 1906
through 2005. That could happen for two reasons. First, the 100 years from
1906 through 2005 may have been wetter than usual. Tree-ring analysis, which
relies on correlation between precipitation and tree growth, has enabled reconstruction of annual natural flows at Lee Ferry going back five centuries.146
Although the tree-ring studies vary somewhat in methodology and result, all of
LINES,

supra note 1, § 8.B, at 58 (substantively similar to States’ Proposed Interim
Guidelines, supra note 8, § 9.A, at J-44).
141 Letter from Rod Kuharich, Dir., Colo. Water Conservation Bd., to Dirk Kempthorne,
Sec’y of the Interior (Apr. 30, 2007), available at http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/programs/
strategies/DEIScomments/State/CWCB.pdf.
142 Cf. 1 FEIS—COLORADO RIVER INTERIM GUIDELINES, supra note 7, at 1-1 (The interim
guidelines “will provide the opportunity to gain valuable operating experience for the management of Lake Powell and Lake Mead under modified operations and improve the basis
for making additional future operational decisions, whether during the interim period or
thereafter.”).
143 Id. at 3-15 (15.072 maf). But cf. id. at 1-11 (approximately 15.1 maf). The natural flow
is reconstructed by adjusting the actual gauged flow for human alteration by upstream storage, alteration, and depletion. Id. at 3-15.
144 Reclamation estimates that the average natural inflow of the Little Colorado, Bill Williams, Virgin, and Muddy Rivers to the Colorado River below Lee Ferry is 1.4 maf. Id. at 111. From the natural inflow must be deducted consumptive uses from these tributaries averaging 0.4 maf. See CONSUMPTIVE USES AND LOSSES, supra note 139, at 34-38. The Gila
River is also a tributary to the Colorado River below Lee Ferry and does not regularly
contribute inflow because of the magnitude of consumptive uses directly from it. See
Charles J. Meyers, The Colorado River, 19 STAN. L. REV. 1, 7 (1966).
145 CONSUMPTIVE USES AND LOSSES, supra note 139, at 31. This figure includes mainstream channel losses in the Lower Basin. See id. at 18-22 tbls.C-2 to C-6 & n.4.
146
COLORADO RIVER BASIN WATER MANAGEMENT, supra note 2, at 100-04.
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them report an average annual natural flow at Lee Ferry below fifteen maf, with
the numbers ranging from thirteen maf to 14.7 maf.147 Second, there is the
possibility that climate change might reduce future annual natural flows at Lee
Ferry below those of the last half-millennium.148
Moreover, as increasing Upper Basin consumptive use reduces the mainstream water supply for the Lower Division states over the long term, the water
needs of the Lower Division states will hardly remain static. MWD expects the
population of its service area to increase by 220,000 annually.149 Southern
Nevada and central Arizona have also experienced very rapid population
growth in recent decades,150 and there is little reason to expect that to cease.
In sum, the possibility of lower average natural river flows and the seeming inexorability of increasing water demands combine to suggest that
shortages on the Colorado River system will not be limited in the future to
drought cycles. Coping with shortages will be a constant concern.
B. Legal Issues Affecting Long-Term Water Supply Between the Two
Basins
The water supply available within each of the two basins, as distinguished
from the total supply for the basins combined, depends on more than precipitation, runoff, and reservoir storage. It also depends on how the law of the
river—a body of more than four dozen statutes, administrative rules and decisions, court decrees, water contracts, interstate compacts, and international documents151—allocates the total supply between the two basins. The seven basin
states disagree about how to interpret various elements of the law of the river
that bear on interbasin allocation.152 The seven states put aside these disagreements when negotiating their recent landmark proposal on coordinated reservoir management and Lower Basin shortages. At the same time, however, they
included a provision in the proposal preserving the right to assert their differing
147

See id. at 104.
See id. at 108-10.
149 Hasencamp, supra note 55, at 1.
150 The U.S. Census Bureau estimates that from 2000 through 2006, the population of Maricopa County, Arizona, home of the metropolitan Phoenix area, grew from 3,072,149 to
3,768,123 or 22.6%, Maricopa County QuickFacts from the U.S. Census Bureau, http://
quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/04/04013.html (last visited May 28, 2008), and the population of Clark County, Nevada, home of the metropolitan Las Vegas area, grew from
1,375,765 to 1,777,539 or 29.2%. Clark County QuickFacts from the U.S. Census Bureau,
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/32/32003.html (last visited May 28, 2008).
151 See 1 FEIS—COLORADO RIVER INTERIM GUIDELINES, supra note 7, at 1-4 n.2, 1-11 to
-14.
152 See, e.g., John U. Carlson & Alan E. Boles, Jr., Contrary Views of the Law of the Colorado River: An Examination of Rivalries Between the Upper and Lower Basins, 32 ROCKY
MTN. MIN. L. INST. 21-1, 21-27 to -28 (1986); David H. Getches, Competing Demands for
the Colorado River, 56 U. COLO. L. REV. 413, 421-25 (1985); David E. Lindgren, The
Colorado River: Are New Approaches Possible Now that the Reality of Overallocation Is
Here?, 38 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 25-1, 25-13 to -19 (1992); James S. Lochhead, An
Upper Basin Perspective on California’s Claims to Water from the Colorado River Part I:
The Law of the River, 4 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 290, 320-26 (2001); Meyers, supra note
144, at 14-17.
148
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views later.153 The future resolution of these disagreements could significantly
affect the water supply within each basin.
To illustrate this point, it will suffice to consider just one of several disagreements regarding the cornerstone of the law of the river, the Colorado
River Compact.154 As noted earlier, the compact provides that if there is not
sufficient surplus water to fill the 1.5 maf treaty delivery obligation to Mexico,
the two basins shall bear the deficiency equally, and the Upper Division states
must deliver enough water at Lee Ferry to supply half the deficiency.155 The
basin states disagree about how to calculate whether a deficiency exists.
The Upper Division states note that the compact apportions 8.5 maf of
consumptive use to the Lower Basin “from the Colorado River System”156 and
also defines the system as “the Colorado River and its tributaries.”157 Lower
Basin tributary consumptive use averages 2.5 maf,158 so in a “normal condition” year when Lower Basin consumptive use from the mainstream is 7.5 maf,
Lower Basin consumptive use from the river system will total ten maf. The
total is even higher if “consumptive use” for compact purposes includes Lower
Basin reservoir evaporation of 1.3 maf.159 The Upper Division states argue
that if the Lower Basin were not exceeding its compact apportionment of 8.5
maf from the system, i.e., the Colorado River and its tributaries, there would be
enough surplus water to satisfy the Mexican delivery, and therefore no deficiency exists triggering their duty to contribute to the Mexican delivery.160
Arizona argues in response that Lower Basin consumptive use is irrelevant
to whether a deficiency exists. Arizona notes that the compact says the Mexican delivery shall “be supplied first from the waters which are surplus over and
above” the sixteen maf that the compact apportions to the Upper and Lower
Basins.161 Arizona argues this means the existence of a surplus, and correlatively a deficiency, depends solely on the water supply.162 Under Arizona’s
view, a deficiency exists unless the system supply is 17.5 maf, i.e., the sixteen
153

See Agreement Concerning Colorado River, supra note 8, ¶ 15, at J-20:

R

Nothing in this Agreement or the Parties’ Recommendation is intended to, nor shall this Agreement be construed so as to, diminish or modify the right of any Party under existing law, including without limitation the Colorado River Compact, the Upper Colorado River Basin Compact,
the Consolidated Decree in Arizona v. California, or the Mexican Water Treaty of 1944. The
Parties hereby affirm the entitlement and right of each State under such existing law to use and
develop the water of the Colorado River System.
154 Another contentious compact issue is discussed infra in text accompanying notes 18593. For discussion of still more unresolved compact issues, see Getches, supra note 152, at
421-27; Meyers, supra note 144, at 14-18.
155 See supra text accompanying note 29.
156 Colorado River Compact of 1922 arts. III(a)-(b), 70 CONG. REC. 324 (1928).
157 Id. art. II(a).
158 See CONSUMPTIVE USES AND LOSSES, supra note 139, at iv.
159 Id. at 31. The Arizona v. California decree defines “consumptive use” to exclude reservoir evaporation. See Arizona v. California, 126 S. Ct. 1543 (2006) (Consolidated Decree
art. I(A)). But the decree applies only to the apportionment of mainstream water among the
three Lower Division states. In contrast, the compact does not define “consumptive use” for
purposes of water allocation between the Upper Basin and Lower Basin.
160 See Lochhead, supra note 152, at 320.
161 Colorado River Compact art. III(c).
162 See Schiffer et al., supra note 48, at 221-22.
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maf that the compact apportions to the two basins plus the 1.5 maf that the
treaty allocates to Mexico.163
If the Upper Division states prevail on the deficiency issue, the adverse
impact on the Lower Division states could be significant. Suppose, for example, that Upper Basin water deliveries to Lee Ferry average only 7.5 maf annually during a decade-long drought and that Lake Mead began the decade with
no accumulated storage to supplement the Lee Ferry deliveries. The amount of
mainstream water available for the Lower Division states on average would be
the 7.5 maf delivered at Lee Ferry plus tributary inflows to the mainstream
below Lee Ferry of 1.0 maf, minus Lower Basin reservoir evaporation of 1.3
maf, and minus the delivery to Mexico of 1.5 maf—which leaves 5.7 maf for
consumptive use by the Lower Division states. In contrast, if the Lower Division states prevail on the deficiency issue, the Upper Basin’s contribution of
half the Mexican delivery, i.e., 0.75 maf or 750,000 acre-feet, would increase
the mainstream supply for the Lower Division states by the same amount.
While not a cure-all, this would be a significant gain for the Lower Division
states.
C. Meeting Water Needs in the Lower Division States Through Supply
Reallocation
The imaginative approaches in the basin states’ proposal that are now
incorporated in the Secretary’s interim guidelines have the potential to avoid a
Lower Division water crisis for some indeterminate period, maybe even for a
considerable time after 2026. Before a crisis can develop, maybe new conservation measures and technological advances in desalination, or even cloud
seeding,164 will become a panacea. The National Research Council is not sanguine about that, however: “Technological and conservation options for augmenting or extending water supplies—although useful and necessary—in the
long run will not constitute a panacea for coping with the reality that water
supplies in the Colorado River basin are limited and that demand is inexorably
rising.”165
Technology to augment existing supplies and conservation to extend them
are only two methods for coping with future water shortages. A third method is
reallocation of water from less productive to more productive use. With agriculture consuming roughly eighty percent of the water used in the Colorado
River basin166 and with growing municipalities able to afford agricultural water
163 Actually, Arizona claims the supply needed to avoid a deficiency is 17.8 maf. Arizona
bases this claim on its view of another unresolved compact issue. If the Upper Basin must
contribute 0.75 maf to the 1.5 maf Mexican delivery, a related issue is whether the Upper
Basin must also contribute half the reservoir and in-transit channel losses associated with
delivering the 1.5 maf from Lee Ferry to Mexico. See Getches, supra note 152, at 422-23;
Meyers, supra note 144, at 17. Arizona estimates the reservoir and channel losses to be
almost 0.3 maf, and it thus contends there is a deficiency for Mexico unless the system
supply exceeds 16.0 + 1.5 + 0.3. See Schiffer et al., supra note 48, at 225-26.
164 See Agreement Concerning Colorado River, supra note 8, ¶ 8, at J-17 (mentioning cloud
seeding).
165 COLORADO RIVER BASIN WATER MANAGEMENT, supra note 2, at 132.
166 Id. at 71.
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or water rights,167 reallocation generally can be expected to take the form of
transfers from agricultural to urban use. The National Research Council has
observed that reallocating only a modest percentage of agricultural water could
“do much” to meet growing urban water needs.168 As noted earlier, the
Extraordinary Conservation ICS guidelines should facilitate agricultural-tourban water reallocation in California. Of course, this will be intrabasin-intrastate reallocation. A variation of the third method, explored below, would be
intrabasin-interstate reallocation. A fourth method, also explored below, would
be interbasin-interstate reallocation from the Upper Basin to the Lower Basin
of water that is being used for agriculture or perhaps water that is part of a
state’s unused apportionment under the Colorado River Compact.
1. Intrabasin-Interstate Reallocation
The interim guidelines take a mixed approach at best toward ICS projects
reallocating water from one Lower Basin state to another. They allow interstate System Efficiency ICS projects, such as the Drop 2 storage reservoir in
California that will benefit SNWA in Nevada, but they limit the incentive for
contractors to create such ICS by permitting them to receive credit for the conserved water only temporarily, not permanently.169 They limit Imported ICS
and Tributary Conservation ICS to intrastate projects.170 Finally, they are not
as explicit about interstate Extraordinary Conservation ICS projects but apparently do not to allow them.
Rather than provide a general definition of Extraordinary Conservation
ICS, the guidelines list specific activities that qualify—including land fallowing, canal lining, and desalination171—followed by a catch-all provision:
“Other extraordinary conservation measures, including but not limited to,
development and acquisition of a non-Colorado River System water supply
used in lieu of Mainstream water within the same state, in consultation with the
Basin States.”172 Unlike the catch-all, the specifically listed activities are not
expressly limited by “within the same state.” That does not mean, however,
that the specifically listed activities can create interstate ICS because the guidelines later condition the creation of all Extraordinary Conservation ICS as
follows:
Extraordinary Conservation ICS from a project within a state may only be credited to
the ICS Account of a Contractor within that state that has funded or implemented the
project creating ICS, or to the ICS Account of a Contractor within the same state as
the funding entity and project and with written agreement of the funding entity.173
167

See id.
Id. at 57.
169 ROD—COLORADO RIVER INTERIM GUIDELINES, supra note 1, § 3.A.3, at 39 (substantively mirroring States’ Proposed Interim Guidelines, supra note 8, § 5.D.3, at J-36).
170 See id. §§ 3.A.2, 3.A.4, at 38-39 (substantively mirroring States’ Proposed Interim
Guidelines, supra note 8, §§ 5.D.2, 5.D.4, at J-36 to -37).
171 Id. §§ 3.A.1.a-c, at 38 (substantively mirroring States’ Proposed Interim Guidelines,
supra note 8, § 5.D.1.a-c, at J-35).
172 Id. § 3.A.1.h, at 38 (emphasis added) (substantively mirroring States’ Proposed Interim
Guidelines, supra note 8, § 5.D.1.h, at J-36).
173 Id. § 3.B.8, at 41 (emphasis added) (substantively mirroring States’ Proposed Interim
Guidelines, supra note 8, § 5.D.5.e(6), at J-39).
168
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The guidelines lack any provision for crediting the ICS account of a contractor from one state that has funded or implemented an Extraordinary Conservation ICS project in another state. By negative implication, the guidelines do
not authorize interstate Extraordinary Conservation ICS projects.174
The apparent hostility of the guidelines to interstate Extraordinary Conservation ICS is especially unfortunate for Nevada. Unlike Arizona and California,175 Nevada has little or no present agricultural use of mainstream water.176
For SNWA to fallow land or line canals to free up agricultural water for urban
use, the land fallowing or canal lining would have to be in Arizona or in California. Similarly, for SNWA to engage in desalination to create Extraordinary
Conservation ICS, the desalination would likely have to occur outside of
Nevada.
The guidelines’ limitation of Extraordinary Conservation ICS to intrastate
projects is interesting from a constitutional law perspective. The Dormant
Commerce Clause bars states from unreasonably prohibiting the interstate
export of water.177 If a state were to enact a statute authorizing a person who
fallows land or lines a canal to use the conserved water elsewhere within the
state but not outside of it, there is little doubt the statute would violate the
Dormant Commerce Clause for explicitly discriminating against interstate commerce in water.178 The Dormant Commerce Clause applies, however, only to
state-imposed limits on interstate commerce, not federally-imposed limits.179
The Secretary’s adoption of the basin states’ proposed ICS guidelines, including the limitation of Extraordinary Conservation ICS to intrastate projects, cir174 One might ask whether the functional equivalent of interstate Extraordinary Conservation ICS could be accomplished through an extra step. Suppose a contractor entitled to ICS
sells or leases the entitlement to a contractor in another state. Even in the unlikely event that
the guidelines were interpreted to allow this extra step and even if Reclamation were willing
to approve the transfer, it seems unlikely to happen. The use of Lake Mead to store the
water or the Colorado River to transport it to the transferee would make it subject to the
Arizona v. California decree unless the transfer is included in a forbearance agreement,
which would require the consent of all affected parties, including the water source state and
contractors within it; and the source state and affected parties in it are unlikely to consent.
175 See 2 FEIS—COLORADO RIVER INTERIM GUIDELINES, supra note 7, app. G, tbls.Att.A-3
to -4 (tables listing water subcontractors in Arizona and California by type of use, including
agricultural use); U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, COLORADO RIVER
ACCOUNTING AND WATER USE REPORT: ARIZONA, CALIFORNIA, AND NEVADA 40 (2007)
(consumptive use of mainstream water in 2006 by California agricultural entities of more
than 3.4 maf).
176 See 2 FEIS—COLORADO RIVER INTERIM GUIDELINES, supra note 7, app. G, tbl.Att.A-2
(table listing water subcontractors in Nevada by type of use).
177 See Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 953-54 (1982).
178 See id. at 957-58. An explicitly discriminatory regulation that serves economic purposes
is virtually per se invalid and can be sustained only by showing it advances a legitimate state
objective, such as public health, that cannot be accomplished in another less discriminatory
way. See Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 454-55 (1992); Nw. Cent. Pipeline Corp. v.
State Corp. Comm’n of Kan, 489 U.S. 493, 523 (1989); City of El Paso v. Reynolds, 563 F.
Supp. 379, 389 (D.N.M. 1983).
179 Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 44 (1980); see also Intake Water Co. v.
Yellowstone River Compact Comm’n, 769 F.2d 568, 570 (9th Cir. 1985) (congressional
consent to a water compact between states immunizes it from the Dormant Commerce
Clause).
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cumvents the Dormant Commerce Clause and its policy against economic
Balkanization of the nation.180
The Secretary could not have modified the basin states’ proposed ICS
guidelines to authorize interstate Extraordinary Conservation ICS. Implementation of the ICS program depends on agreement by the affected states and
contractors to forbear their rights to surplus water under the Arizona v. California decree, and the forbearance agreement is expressly conditioned on the Secretary adopting “an ICS program that is in substantial conformance with this
Forbearance Agreement.”181
The reason the basin states’ proposed guidelines did not embrace interstate
Extraordinary Conservation ICS is not publicly known. Perhaps the states
thought water supply-and-demand conditions from 2008 through 2026 would
not be serious enough for them to have to grapple with that issue. Perhaps
some states feared interstate Extraordinary Conservation ICS might be an opening wedge that later would lead to pressure for interbasin-interstate leases or
sales that they strongly oppose.
Whatever the reason, if the Secretary ever decides Lower Basin water conditions require interstate Extraordinary Conservation ICS projects, he might try
to persuade the basin states to agree to them.182 If the Secretary encounters
state intransigence toward desalination, canal lining, or land fallowing that
would reallocate Colorado River water between Lower Division states, he
might consider exercising the potential for “friendly persuasion” inherent in his
power as watermaster of the Lower Basin and operator of federal reservoirs in
the Upper Basin to interpret unresolved ambiguities in the law of the river. The
interim guidelines explicitly bar the Secretary from resolving ambiguities in the
law of the river,183 but as the years pass and expiration of the interim guidelines
draws ever closer, basin states might legitimately become concerned about
adverse Secretarial resolution of contentious law-of-the-river issues, whether or
180 Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 472 (2005) (“[A] central concern of the Framers . . .
was . . . the conviction that in order to succeed, the new Union would have to avoid the
tendencies toward economic Balkanization that had plagued relations among the Colonies
and later among the States under the Articles of Confederation.” (quoting Hughes v.
Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325-26 (1979))).
181 Forbearance Agreement, supra note 8, art. 3.4.C, at J-63. The copy of the Forbearance
Agreement after its execution by the parties appears as an exhibit to water delivery agreements available at http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/programs/strategies/agreements/IIDICS.pdf
(agreement between the United States and the Imperial Irrigation District); http://www.usbr.
gov/lc/region/programs/strategies/agreements/MWDICS.pdf (agreement between the United
States and the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California); http://www.usbr.gov/lc/
region/programs/strategies/agreements/SNWAICS.PDF (agreement between the United
States and the Southern Nevada Water Authority and Colorado River Commission of
Nevada).
182 The cover letter from the states transmitting their agreement to the Secretary suggests
they might someday be amenable to some interstate Extraordinary Conservation ICS
projects, namely, those that do not reallocate Colorado River water but rather augment the
water supply. The letter contemplates future authorization for “water users in Arizona, California, or Nevada to secure additional water supplies by funding the development of a nonColorado River System water supply in one Lower Division State for use in another Lower
Division State by exchange.” Letter to Sec’y, supra note 8, at J-4. This would allow
intrabasin-interstate desalination.
183 ROD—COLORADO RIVER INTERIM GUIDELINES, supra note 1, § 8.A, at 57.
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not related to intrabasin-interstate reallocation. Concerned states might come
to see the wisdom of agreeing to authorize some intrabasin-interstate Extraordinary Conservation ICS projects in return for a deal that would protect them
from the feared adverse resolution.184
2. Interbasin-Interstate Reallocation
Sometimes the most economical and environmentally acceptable way for
rapidly growing Lower Division municipalities to obtain needed water supplies
might be to lease or purchase water or water rights from Upper Basin appropriators, tribes with exercised or unexercised reserved water rights, or states with
unused apportionments. The states disagree about whether the Colorado River
Compact prohibits all interbasin transfers.185
The Upper Division states point out that article III(a) of the compact
apportions to each basin “in perpetuity . . . the exclusive beneficial consumptive use” of 7.5 maf annually.186 They argue this means the Upper Basin’s 7.5
maf of beneficial consumptive use must forever occur exclusively in that basin,
and none of the water needed for such use can be sold or leased for use in the
Lower Basin.187 They contend article VIII reinforces this result188 by providing “[a]ll . . . rights to beneficial use of waters of the Colorado River System
shall be satisfied solely from the water apportioned to that basin in which they
are situate.”189 Finally, they note article III(e) prohibits the Upper Division
states from withholding water that they cannot put to domestic or agricultural
use but the Lower Division states can.190 They argue this means the unused
part of an Upper Division state’s apportionment cannot be sold or leased
because the state has nothing to transfer, and the same is true of tribes with
unexercised reserved water rights.191
The Lower Division states have not always opposed these arguments
because they liked the idea of being able to get extra water free under article
184 Implementation of interstate Extraordinary Conservation ICS projects may require separate state regulatory approval. Cf. id. § 3.B.1.e, at 40 (contractor proposal to create ICS
must submit to Secretary documentation regarding any state permits obtained or that need to
be obtained). Water transfers can have adverse effects on third parties, see COLORADO
RIVER BASIN WATER MANAGEMENT, supra note 2, at 59, that state laws regulate. It may be
advisable, therefore, to consider adjusting state laws on water transfers or exchanges to facilitate them while still taking account of third-party effects. Cf. Robert Glennon & Michael J.
Pearce, Transferring Mainstem Colorado River Water Rights: The Arizona Experience, 49
ARIZ. L. REV. 235, 242-48, 256 (2007) (discussing the applicability of both federal and state
rules to the intrastate transfer of Colorado River water rights in Arizona and recommending
that Reclamation and the Arizona Department of Water Resources work together to “remove
unnecessary or outdated impediments to these transfers and, especially, . . . to smooth the
way for the reallocation of water where such reallocation enhances state and federal water
management goals”).
185 Compare Lochhead, supra note 152, at 324-26 (prohibited), with Lindgren, supra note
152, at 25-34 to -36 (allowed).
186 Colorado River Compact of 1922 art. III(a), 70 CONG. REC. 324 (1928).
187 Lochhead, supra note 152, at 324-26.
188 Id.
189 Colorado River Compact art. VIII (subject to an exception not relevant here).
190 Id. art. III(e). This provision is affected by section 602(a) of the Colorado River Basin
Project Act of 1968. See supra text accompanying notes 37-39.
191 Lochhead, supra note 152, at 326.
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III(e) rather than having to purchase or lease it. But Lower Division advocates
have sometimes offered counterarguments. They say article III(a) does not
impose a geographical restriction on water use. Rather, it apportions 7.5 maf to
the Upper Basin states for them to administer under their respective legal
regimes, and state water laws generally allow sale or lease for out-of-state use
as freely as for in-state use, as required by the Dormant Commerce Clause.192
Also, they argue that even if the word “rights” in article VIII were to prevent
the interbasin sale of a water right, it does not prevent the leasing of water
under an Upper Basin water right for Lower Basin use.193
Litigation might someday be required to resolve the uncertain status of
interbasin transfers under the compact. In the spirit of avoiding litigation of
that compact issue, as well as other contentious law-of-the-river issues, the discussion below outlines a daring litigation strategy. The premise underlying the
strategy is that the prospect of litigating such issues should be daunting enough
to motivate the states to collaborate on a resolution less unpredictable and less
flexible than judicial resolution.
The litigation strategy is daring because it rejects the conventional understanding that a state cannot withdraw from a water compact unless the compact
authorizes withdrawal.194 The Supreme Court has taken notice of the conventional understanding but has not directly passed on its validity.195 The problem
with the conventional understanding is that it overlooks the reserved powers
doctrine.
The reserved powers doctrine prohibits a state from contractually surrendering any of its essential sovereign powers.196 The rationale is that states
were organized for the purpose of exercising essential sovereign powers, and
the subjects of those powers inherently require continuing state supervision.197
Because a state lacks capacity to contract away the future exercise of any
essential sovereign power, it can later reject or withdraw from a contract purporting to surrender the power without liability or penalty.
The classic example of the reserved powers doctrine is Stone v. Mississippi.198 The Mississippi Legislature issued a corporate charter, which has the
status of a contract between the state and the corporation,199 authorizing the
corporation to operate a lottery in the state for a specified period.200 Later, but
before the period expired, the Legislature banned lotteries in the interests of
promoting public health and public morals.201 The corporation challenged the
192

Lindgren, supra note 152, at 25-34 to -36.
David J. Guy, When the Law Dulls the Edge of Chance: Transferring Upper Basin
Water to the Lower Colorado River Basin, 1991 UTAH L. REV. 25, 35.
194 See FREDERICK L. ZIMMERMANN & MITCHELL WENDELL, THE LAW AND USE OF INTERSTATE COMPACTS 40 (1961).
195 Texas v. New Mexico, 462 U.S. 554, 569-70 (1983).
196 United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 888 (1996); U.S. Trust Co. v. New Jersey,
431 U.S. 1, 23 (1977); Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 435 (1934).
197 Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 819 (1879).
198 Id.
199 Planters’ Bank of Miss. v. Sharp, 47 U.S. 301, 309 (1848); Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v.
Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 590 (1819).
200 Stone, 101 U.S. at 817.
201 Id. at 819.
193
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ban on the ground that it impaired the lottery contract in violation of the Contract Clause of the United States Constitution.202 The Supreme Court upheld
the ban because “[n]o legislature can bargain away the public health or the
public morals.”203 In other cases, the Court has applied the reserved powers
doctrine to enable a legislature to promote the public welfare in the form of
citizen economic well-being.204
If the reserved powers doctrine applies to a state legislature’s ratification
of an interstate water apportionment compact, a later legislature would be free
to withdraw from the compact in order to seek a more favorable water allocation for its citizens by another means. The Court has never specifically
addressed the applicability of the reserved powers doctrine to an interstate compact. An interstate compact differs from a contract between a state and a private party. All the parties to the compact are states, and the Compact Clause of
the Constitution requires the consent of Congress for the agreement to become
operative.205 But the author has argued at length elsewhere that the reserved
powers doctrine should apply to water compacts and allow withdrawal by a
signatory state.206 This would include the Colorado River Compact and would
allow a basin state to withdraw despite the lack of any provision in the compact
authorizing that.
If a state withdraws from a water compact, the alternatives open to it for
seeking a more favorable allocation are an act of Congress or a Supreme Court
decree. Congress has been extremely reluctant to exercise its power to allocate
rivers between states,207 so Supreme Court allocation seems the more viable
alternative. The Court applies federal interstate common law208 that calls for
an “equitable apportionment of benefits between the . . . States resulting from
the flow of the river.”209 Under this principle, the Court considers “all the
factors which create equities in favor of one State or the other.”210 While the
relevant factors vary from case to case and are potentially numerous,211 three
factors have played recurring and prominent roles.
First, the Court is inclined to protect existing economies dependent on
water use,212 especially over proposed uses.213 The Court has said, “[T]he
equities supporting the protection of existing economies will usually be compelling. The harm that may result from disrupting established uses is typically
202

Id. at 816.
Id. at 819.
204 E.g., City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 508 (1965); Chicago & Alton R.R. Co.
v. Tranbarger, 238 U.S. 67, 76-77 (1915); Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co. v. City of Goldsboro,
232 U.S. 548, 558-61 (1914).
205 Texas v. New Mexico, 462 U.S. 554, 559 (1983) (dictum); Hinderlider v. La Plata River
& Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 105 (1938) (dictum).
206 Douglas L. Grant, Interstate Water Allocation Compacts: When the Virtue of Permanence Becomes the Vice of Inflexibility, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 105 (2003).
207 Id. at 173-75.
208 See Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 565-66 (1963).
209 Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 118 (1907).
210 Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S. 383, 394 (1943), quoted in Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325
U.S. 589, 618 (1945).
211 See Nebraska, 325 U.S. at 618 (listing eight factors but adding the list was “merely an
illustrative, not an exhaustive catalogue”).
212
See id. at 618-21; Washington v. Oregon, 297 U.S. 517, 523 (1936).
203

\\server05\productn\N\NVJ\8-3\NVJ310.txt

Spring 2008]

unknown

Seq: 28

COLORADO RIVER WATER SHORTAGES

18-AUG-08

12:54

991

certain and immediate, whereas the potential benefits from a proposed diversion may be speculative and remote.”214
Second, the Court compares the harms and benefits in the competing states
if one gets the water at issue and the other does not.215 Notwithstanding the
Court’s inclination to protect existing economies, this second factor is powerful
enough to justify reallocating water from existing use in one state to new use in
another state if the benefits will substantially outweigh the harm.216
Third, the Court expects every state to use financially and physically feasible measures to conserve and augment its water supply, and a state’s failure to
do so will count against it in equitable apportionment.217 This concern dovetails with a harm-benefit comparison. The state that does not get the water at
issue will suffer less harm to the extent it can offset the loss by conservation or
augmentation measures.218 Similarly, the state that gets the water will benefit
less to the extent it could have freed up other water through conservation or
augmentation.219
These three recurring and prominent equitable apportionment factors generally favor the Lower Division states. The Upper Division states, which are
presently using less than two-thirds of their compact apportionment, project
increasing new uses of water. During shortage conditions, these new uses often
will come at the expense of earlier Lower Division uses. The Court’s inclination to protect existing uses favors the Lower Division. Furthermore, to the
extent the new Upper Basin water uses will be for low-value irrigation, harmbenefit comparison is unlikely to help Upper Basin states overcome the preference for protecting existing uses. Finally, Lower Division ICS projects developed under the Secretary’s guidelines should help the Lower Division states
with the apportionment factor requiring feasible water conservation and supply
augmentation.
This is not to suggest the Upper Basin states would lack equities to urge
upon the Court or that any Lower Division state could be totally confident of
gaining more water from equitable apportionment litigation. Equitable apportionment requires the weighing of multiple factors that are incommensurable,
and there is a dearth of precedent on how to weigh competing factors. For
these reasons, unpredictability is the hallmark of equitable apportionment litigation. Two Upper Basin advocates graphically called the unpredictability the
“terror” of equitable apportionment litigation.220 Interestingly, however, they
acknowledged that if the Court were to apportion equitably the Colorado River,
“the northern states would be up the proverbial creek without a paddle.”221
213 Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419, 469 (1922) (desirable to protect “a recognized and
profitable industry . . . carried on [in Wyoming] for many years . . . of general economic
value” against proposed water use in Colorado).
214 Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176, 187 (1982).
215 See id. at 186-87.
216 Id. at 187.
217 Id. at 185.
218 Id. at 187-88.
219 Id. at 188.
220 Carlson & Boles, supra note 152, at 21-32.
221 Id. at 21-45.
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If any of several ambiguities in the Colorado River Compact and other
elements of the law of the river were to be litigated rather than resolved collaboratively, a win for the Upper Division states might leave the Lower Division states feeling so frustrated and disadvantaged by the outcome that one or
more of them would respond by filing suit in the Supreme Court to withdraw
from the compact and obtain an equitable apportionment decree. For example,
suppose the Upper Division states get a judgment interpreting the compact to
prohibit the interbasin sale or lease of water or water rights, and a Lower Division state then brings suit to withdraw from the compact and obtain an equitable apportionment. Conceivably, if not probably, the Supreme Court would
enter an apportionment decree giving the Upper Division states less water than
the compact did. If so, the Upper Division states would have been better off
agreeing to sell or lease water to the Lower Division state rather than litigating
and winning the compact interpretation issue but later losing the water under
the equitable apportionment doctrine without getting any quid pro quo.
The litigation strategy just outlined is daring for another reason besides its
challenge to conventional wisdom about compact withdrawal. Equitable apportionment litigation provides no assurance of victory for a state that feels disadvantaged by the Colorado River Compact. The Court will dismiss the suit
before reaching the merits if the United States is an indispensable party, as it
likely would be,222 and it refuses to waive its sovereign immunity and join the
suit. If the suit does go forward on the merits, the litigation would be expensive and would likely take a decade or more. The greatest drawback of equitable apportionment litigation, however, is its previously noted unpredictability
of outcome.
While these difficulties should make a dissatisfied state think twice about
seeking to withdraw from the Colorado River Compact and obtain an equitable
apportionment, the “terror” of unpredictability in such litigation, if it occurs,
ought to weigh on the other basin states as well. This ought to make these
states consider seriously the risk that a refusal to negotiate and compromise on
contentious compact issues, or other law-of-the-river issues, will trigger the
“nuclear option” of compact withdrawal and equitable apportionment. If the
United States wishes to encourage collaboration regarding contentious issues, it
could signal its possible willingness to waive sovereign immunity should a
state file suit for compact withdrawal and equitable apportionment.
The Secretary’s 2005 announcement of her intent to develop guidelines on
coordinated reservoir operations and Lower Basin shortages stimulated the
seven basin states to develop their innovative recent agreement with potential
benefits for every state. Perhaps the prospect of litigation for compact withdrawal and equitable apportionment will someday become likely and daunting
enough to be a catalyst for the states to overcome intransigence regarding contentious law-of-the-river issues and discover innovative ways to resolve them
collaboratively.
222 Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 601 (1963) (dismissal of Arizona’s suit for equitable apportionment of unappropriated water because the United States was an unjoined but
indispensable party).
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III. CONCLUSION
When the seven basin states submitted their proposal on Lower Basin
shortages and coordinated reservoir operations to the Secretary, Colorado’s
Governor Bill Ritter called the agreement “the first step in a new era of Western state cooperation.”223 It is unclear whether he was referring only to cooperation regarding approval of new ICS projects under the interim guidelines as
they now stand or to some broader kind of cooperation. He surely was not
referring to interbasin reallocation given Colorado’s longstanding opposition to
that.224 But one can hope the seven states’ agreement becomes the first step in
a new era of broader collaboration that someday will enable intrabasin-interstate and interbasin-interstate reallocation to cope with an ever-growing imbalance between water supply and demand in the Lower Basin.

223 7 Colorado River States Submit Water Sharing Plan, CBS DENVER, May 1, 2007, http://
cbs4denver.com/local/Colorado.News.Denver.2.558549.html.
224 See Lochhead, supra note 152, at 322-29.
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